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Abstract 
As part of the IMF sponsored stabilization  programme, the Gambia has been pursuing base monetary targeting. 
To ascertain whether this policy framework satisfies the necessary condition for effectiveness, this paper 
presents an empirical investigation into the determinants and stability of money demand (M2)   in the short-run 
and long-run in the Gambian economy during the period 1986:1 - 2012:4. Using theoretical defensible 
specification of the money demand function in line with the Keynesian precautionary, transacation and  
speculative motives for holding money and its various extensions by Friedman, Baumol and Tobin, the paper  
applied  Gregory -Hansen cointegration techniques allowing for structural breaks. The papers finds the existence 
of a long run and short-run cointegration relationship  in the money demand function and its determinants 
namely income, interest rate, inflation and exchange rate in the Gambia. The cointegration relationship with 
breaks suggests a structural break which occurred in 1995:1 reflecting the military coup and fall in foreign aid in 
the Gambia during the period.  The structural break is also clearly identifiable with the 50% devaluation of the 
CFA franc,  the border closure and transit controls in Senegal, as well as the suspension of convertibility  of the  
CFA franc outside the franc zone in the period 1994-1996. Through establishing  the existence of a  dynamic 
short-run  error correction model we found that cointegration model with intercept shift best characterize the 
equilibrium relationship of the money demand function when there exists a structural break.   Furthermore,  by  
the cumulative sums of squares of recursive residuals test, the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests, we found that the 
money demand function is unstable both in the short-run and in the long-run during the period under 
investigation.  Consequently the continued use of monetary targeting by the Central Bank of the Gambia (CBG) 
is misguided and suboptimal. This is even more so because there is no statistically significant relationship 
between money supply and inflation.  The Central Bank of the Gambia  (CBG) should  adopt  instead a flexible 
combination of elements of inflation targeting and monetary supply target framework to  maintain price stability  
and promote noninflationary economic growth. 
 
Introduction 
The  demand for money  has attracted the  attention of  great economists of old. From David Hume(1752) to 
Irving Fisher (1896, 1911), John Maynard Keynes (1923, 1936),  William Baumol(1952), Milton Friedman 
(1956) and James Tobin (1956, 1958) these economists  have examined the determinants of the demand for 
money. Since then the interest in the demand for money has not abated as seen in Adekunle (1968) for developed 
and  developing countries, Tomori(1972) for  Nigeria,  Wong (1977) for developing countries, Judd and 
Scadding (1982), in a survey, Calomiris and Domowitz (1989) for Brazil,  Arize (1989) for  four  Asian 
countries, Kallon (1992) for Ghana,  Adam (1992a,b) for Kenya,  and Fielding (1994) for African countries. 
Others include  Agenor and Khan (1996) for developing countries,  Ericsson(1998) for United Kingdom, Lee 
and Chung(1995) for Korea, Simmons (1991) for five African countries, Nyong (2001) for Nigeria,  Bahmani-
Oskooee and Rehman(2005) for Asian developing countries, Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan(2009) for African 
countries, Drama and Yao (2010) for Cote d’Ivoire,  Halicioglu andUgur(2005) for developing OECD countries,  
Haug (2006) for Canada  and Abdelnacer et al. (2013) for Algeria. 
The sustained interests in the demand for money is predicated on the fact that understanding the key 
determinants of money demand is central to  effective monetary policy formulation and implementation, 
irrespective of whether the economy is developed or developing. To this end stability of the money demand 
function is of critical importance. If money demand is stable, it becomes possible for central banks to predict the 
impact of monetary policy on various macroeconomic aggregates such as inflation, output, consumption, and 
investment.  Poole (1970) argued that the rate of interest should be targeted if liquidity preference  is unstable, 
while monetary aggregate (M1 or M2) should be targeted to stabilize the economy if money demand is stable 
and investment-savings relationship is unstable. Thus, the stability of the money demand function is required if 
monetary targeting is to become an optimal policy choice for the conduct of monetary policy. A stable money 
demand function  implies stable money multiplier and, therefore, stability guarantees that predicting the effect of 
a given money supply on aggregate income is possible (Pradhan and Subramanian 2003, Narayan and Narayan 
2008). Consequently, it is  necessary to select the correct monetary policy instruments since selecting the wrong 
instruments may lead to large fluctuations in output and inflation. 
The interest in money demand according to Sriram (2001) is further heightened in recent years by “the 
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concern among central banks and researchers” on the effect on money demand  of “ movement toward flexible 
exchange rate regime,  globalization of capital markets, ongoing domestic financial liberalization and innovation, 
advancement in time series econometrics, and country-specific issues”. Thus,  the stability of money demand 
should be continuously evaluated  in the light of these  financial  developments across countries.  
Despite the importance of the demand for money for the conduct of monetary policy, it comes as a 
surprise that empirical studies on the subject in the Gambia are  few.  A search identifies only three, namely 
Ceesay (2000), Subramanian (2009), and  Jammeh(2012). The first and the third are thesis submitted for the 
award of degrees while the second is a study a staff of IMF.  While Ceesay examined the demand for narrow 
money (M1) alone, Subrahmanian (2009) focused on the long –run demand for broad  money (M2). He observed 
that  the demand for money in The Gambia is not stable and therefore the continued use of monetary targeting by 
the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) is clearly suboptimal. He noted that the money  multiplier has also not 
been stable and  no “clear relationship” exists “between growth in broad money and inflation”.  This view is 
consistent with an earlier findings by Worrell et al. (2008) who noted that “monetary policy [in The Gambia] is 
conducted in an environment of uncertainty about the stability, persistence and relative importance of the 
possible channels of monetary transmission”. 
Although Jammeh (2012) investigated the short –and long-run determinants of demand for money and 
its stability there are some important shortcomings that require attention.  First the omissions  of  own rate of 
interest for M2 in the money demand function specification and estimation casts some doubt on the 
appropriateness of the estimated money demand function for the Gambia.  As noted in  Ericsson(1998), failure to 
include own rate of money often leads to break down in the estimated money demand function during periods of 
financial innovation.  Second the failure to recognize the importance of structural breaks and endogenizing the 
break within the underlying cointegration framework suggests that misleading conclusion about the  money 
demand relationship is possible.  Given the various political, financial and economic shocks that hit the Gambia 
it is expected that such shocks must have exerted significant impact on the nature of the relationship in the 
money demand function as is the case in other studies (Narayan and Narayan 2008, Singh and Pandey 2009,  
Rao and Kumar 2009,  Singh and Kumar 2010; Kumar et al. 2010, Chukwu et al. 2010, Omotor and Omotor 
2011,  Banafea 2012). 
Given the lacunae identified in previous studies on the demand for money in the Gambia, the objective 
of this study is to contribute to the empirical literature on the stability of money demand by investigating  and 
estimating money demand relationships using more up-to-date econometric methods that allows for  endogenous 
structural breaks in the cointegrating  relationship for the Gambia.  Specifically, we estimate  determinants of the 
money demand function  and test for the stability of the relationship in the short- run and in the long-run. The 
method used is the Gregory-Hansen cointegration  approach in view of its superiority to other cointegration 
methods such as the residual based Engle-Granger (1987) two-step approach,  the Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood Multivariate Johansen (1988, 1992), Johansen and Juselius (1990), Pesaran  and Pesaran(1996), 
Pesaran and Shin (1998),  Pesaran and Schimdt (1999), and Pesaran et al. (2001). These and other cointegration 
models fail to capture endogenous structural breaks in the underlying long–run equilibrium relationship.  This 
way our study hopes to contribute to effective monetary policy formulation and implementation in the Gambian 
economy. 
The rest of this study is organized in five sections.  Section I has been the introduction. In section II we 
provide a brief review of  monetary policy in The Gambia and the various shocks that hit the economy. The 
theoretical framework and analytical methodology are articulated in section III.  We present the empirical results 
and the analysis in section IV. We conclude the study in section V  with a summary of the main results and  
some monetary policy  implications. 
  
II   The Conduct of Monetary  Policy in The Gambia 
The Gambia is a small, least developed and open economy with a narrow economic base. The economy is 
heavily dependent on groundnut exports and tourism. After a relatively good economic performance in the early 
1970s the Gambian economic and financial situations deteriorated as a result of expansionary financial policies, 
overvalued exchange rate and increasing imbalances in the balance of payments. 
As a consequence the Government launched the economy recovery programme (ERP) in 1985. A 
managed floating exchange rate regime was adopted as well as interest rate deregulation in 1986. To consolidate 
on the adjustment reform, a programme for sustainable development  was introduced in 1990. The Gambian 
vision 2020, adopted in 1996, remains  the government’s overall guiding development policy document. It calls 
for the  transformation of the Gambian economy into a dynamic middle income  country by 2020.  To achieve 
this objective monetary policy and the Central Bank of The Gambia  have crucial roles to play. 
The CBG  Act 2005 and the Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) term of reference emphasizes 
monetary (price) stability as the core objective of monetary policy. This is important because price stability is 
critical in fostering macroeconomic stability which is part of the enabling environment for growth and 
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development. The Monetary Policy Committee meets every two months to decide on the level of rediscount rate 
which is announced by a press release. In the third quarter of 2005 the monetary policy rate was 21 percent. This 
was reduced to 19 percent during the fourth quarter. By fourth quarter of 2010 it has been cut to 15 percent.  In 
this framework which assumes a stable  demand for money and money multiplier, the CBG uses  M2 as the 
intermediate target and high-powered money as operating target. The CBG continuously monitors net domestic 
asset (NDA) to ensure that it does not increase beyond a specified ceiling and  net foreign asset (NFA) is also 
monitored such that it does not fall below a prescribed floor. The CBG signals its monetary policy stance by 
announcing the rediscount rate during the usual bimonthly meetings.  
Prior to 2005, the CBG had been following an interest rate targeting regime whereby the bank rate is 
used as instrument to control inflation and effective demand.  In 2002 the CBG increased the bank rate from 18 
percent in the third quarter to 25 percent in the fourth quarter to contain  effective demand and inflationary 
pressures which has increased from 7.7 percent to 13.4 percent. The bank rate was further increased to 28 
percent by 2003:2. 
As a guide to the amount of liquidity to be injected/mopped  in the economy to attain operating target  
the MPC uses a short-term liquidity forecasting framework which takes into consideration the likely changes in  
government spending, the issuance of maturing treasury bills, and/or purchase/sale of foreign exchange during 
the forecast period (see Subramanian 2009).  Although the CBG has available policy instruments such as open 
market operations (OMO), reserve requirements, rediscount window  and purchase or sale of foreign exchange, 
it is OMO that is frequently used. For instance, in  2011, the objective of monetary policy was to contain 
inflation below 6.0 percent. To achieve the objective, open market operations was freely used as the major tool 
for liquidity management (WAIFEM, 2011). 
As a core policy target, the outcomes of  broad money (M2)  growth  in percent  between  2006 and 
2011 inclusive are 26.65%, 6.78%, 18.16%, 14.83, 17.84% and 11.20% respectively.  These figures do not 
suggest  good performance since  they  compare unfavourably with the targets. The broad money targets  
between 2006 and 2011 inclusive are  13.3%, 13.3%, 13.3%. 12.5, 12.5% and 12.5%  respectively as seen in 
Central Bank of the Gambia statistical bulletin (various issues). The targets are also derived in part from the 
projections in the poverty reduction and growth  facility programme (PRGF)(2006-2008). As a financial 
deepening variable, the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP from 2006 to 2011 inclusive are respectively 
12.8%, 12.7%, 13.5%, 13.7%, 13.1%, and 14% respectively (World Bank African Development Indicators 
2013). These show modest improvements suggesting that more work needs to be done towards directing more 
domestic credit to the private sector.  With monetary policy shift from interest rate targeting to monetary 
targeting framework, the policy relevance of this study is not in doubt. 
In general monetary policy has largely been expansionary and accommodative with slippages from 
targets due to fiscal pressures. For example between 2002 and 2004, fiscal slippages, accommodating monetary 
policy, falling international reserves and depreciation of Dalasi by 55% in nominal effective terms led to 
inflation  rising from 8.6% in 2002 to 17.03% in 2003 before moderating to 14.2% in 2004.  Between 2000 and 
2011 annual inflation averaged 6.39%  and average GDP growth was about 3.37 during the same period. 
Average fiscal deficit/GDP ratio was about -5.19 %  between 1999-2012 while  money supply growth averaged 
21.14% during the same period (World Bank 2013).  Thus, average monetary expansion was very much in 
excess of the 9.8% predicted by quantity theory of money under constant velocity of circulation of money. 
Figure 1  highlights  developments and trends in inflation rate (INFLA), growth in broad money (M2G), fiscal 
deficit/GDP ratios (FISDY),  and economic growth (GDPG)   between 1999 and 2012. There  appears to be no 
linkage between monetary expansion and inflationary pressures in the Gambia.  
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The  Gambia has experienced a number of shocks including (i) the 50 percent devaluation of the CFA franc in 
1994 (ii) the military coup in 19994 which toppled a democratically elected civilian government, (iii) the drastic 
decline in foreign aid and tourism because of the coup, (iv) the presidential election  of 1996, (v) the financial 
innovation of 2002 by which residents were permitted to have foreign currency deposits, (vi) the  55 percent 
devaluation in nominal effective terms in 2003 and (vii) the establishment of the Monetary Policy 
Committee(MPC)  in 2004.   The Gambian macroeconomic variables such as real GDP, broad money (M2), 
inflation (INFLA) and interest rates are likely to be affected  by these structural changes particularly in 
estimating the money demand function. 
 
III Theoretical framework and Analytical Methodology 
The theoretical underpinning of the demand for money is rooted in the Keynesian liquidity preference theory  of 
the motives for holding money (transaction, precautionary and speculative) and the extensions by the monetarists 
championed by Milton  Friedman (1956) and others such as Baumol (1952) and Tobin(1956, 1958) in their 
inventory theoretic exposition. The arguments in the money demand have always included a scale variable 
(income) and  opportunity cost of holding money which includes various forms of asset. In general the model 
takes the form: 
M/P =f(Y, r, TBR)                                .          .             .          (1) 
or its extension 
M/P =f(Y, r, R, TBR, INFL,  EXR)    .          .             .          (2) 
 where M/P= real money balances, M=broad money, P=consumer price index, y=real income measured by real 
GDP  reflecting the transaction and precautionary motives for holding money, r=own  rate of interest measured 
by saving deposit rate, R=foreign interest rate measured by US short term interest rate capturing alternative 
returns on money in foreign financial assets, TBR=treasury bill rate  for opportunity cost of holding financial 
asset in the domestic economy, INFL=inflation rate reflecting the opportunity cost of holding real assets in the 
goods market, and EXR=expected depreciation of the exchange rate  capturing currency substitution and is 
measured by the exchange rate of the Dalasi against the US dollar. 
The above  equations captures monetary conditions in the Gambia which is a small open economy with managed 
floating exchange rate regime and a financial sector dominated by sixteen (16) banks as well as interest rate 
regime free of interest rate controls.  
The econometric specification of the model for the Gambia takes the form: 
L(M/P)t= λ0 +  λ1LYt + λ2rt +  λ3TBRt + λ4INFLt +  λ5EXRt  + u1t .    .    . (3) 
                           λ1, λ 2>0, λ3,<0,  but  λ4, λ5 >0 or <0, 
where t after a variable represents time, uit is the stochastic error term with the usual white noise 
properties, and the  signs for  income (+), own interest rate(+)  and domestic interest rate (TBR) (-) are straight 
forward as seen in various other studies: Arize et al. (1990), Adam(1992a,b), Kallon (1992),  Arize (1992), 
Sriram(1999), Nacheta (2001), Akinlo(2005) Narayan and Narayan (2008), Sriram (2009) and Abdelnacer et al. 
(2013). However, the signs for expected inflation and expected depreciation of the exchange rate are ambiguous.  
When inflation is  rising economic agents prefer to hold real assets rather than hold money in line with 
Friedman’s reformulated quantity theory of money. However, the sign may turn positive in the peculiar 
circumstance where  rising inflation leads to agents  holding more money “in the expectation that their planned 
nominal expenditures go up”. Similarly, as exchange rate depreciates domestic economic agents may substitute 
national currency for foreign currency. However, if depreciation heightens expectation that national currency 
will appreciate, this could induce residents to “hold more domestic money”.  Foreign interest rate (R) was 
excluded in equation (3) because preliminary analysis indicates this aspect of substitution is not important in the 
Gambia. 
We first test for unit root using Ng Perron (2001) modified  unit root test. The choice of the Ng Perron 
method is motivated by its superiority to the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root 
tests which suffer potentially severe  finite sample power and size distortions.  The ADF and PP tests have low 
power against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity or trend stationarity with a large autoregressive root(De 
Jong et al. 1992) and  severe size distortions when the series has a large negative  moving average root (Schwert, 
1989).  Within the Ng Perron framework the time series  is detrended or demeaned by applying generalized least 
squares (GLS) approach which helps in improving its power and decrease the size distortions. Furthermore an 
optimal selection of the autoregressive truncation lag criteria is used given that the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) and Schawrz Bayessian information criterion (SBIC) used in ADF and PP  choose  a miniscule lag length 
when there exists a large moving average root.  
After testing for the order of integration of the variables in the money demand function we then  apply 
the  Gregory and Hansen (1996a,b)  cointegration technique that considers structural break and identifies the 
break date. The null hypothesis of  no cointegration   is tested against the alternative of cointegration with 
breaks. We apply  equation (2) to the three models  considered by Gregory and Hansen (GH): 
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GH-1: Level Shift (Change in intercept):  The Crash Model 
L(M/P)t= θ1 + θ2Dtk + λ1LYt + λ2rt +  λ3TBRt + λ4INFLt +  λ5EXRt  + u1t .    .    . (3) 
GH-2: Level shift with trend:Changing Growth Model 
L(M/P)t= θ1 + θ2Dtk + β1t + λ1LYt + λ2rt +  λ3TBRt + λ4INFL +  λ5EXRt  + u1t ...     (4) 
GH-3:  Regime shift (intercept and slope coefficients change)  
L(M/P)t= θ1 + θ2Dtk + β1t + λ1LYt + λ11LYt Dtk+ λ2rt + λ22rtDtk + λ3TBRt + λ33TBRtDtk  +λ4INFLt + λ44INFLtDtk  
λ5EXRt  + λ55EXRtDtk +u1t .    .    . (5) 
where  Dtk  = 0  iff t ≤ k                                                                                 (6) 
            Dtk  = 1 iff t > k 
Dtk is the shift in the slope, intercept or trend coefficient, k is the point at which the break date occurs. 
The break dates are attained by estimating the cointegration equations for all possible break dates within  the 
interval grid (0.15  0.85) and a break date is selected where the absolute value of the ADF test statistic is at its 
maximum.  Thus, for each of the models  (3) – (5) the Dickey-Fuller (DF)  test of equation (6) is estimated, with  
value employed as a resulting test statistic being the minimum value obtained for the t-ratio: 
ADF*(q) =inf  ADF (q) 
Z*b=infZb(q) 
Zb(q) = T(Pt -1). 
The crash model (GH-1) means that there is a level shift  or change in intercept in the cointegration 
relatiohship. The parameter θ1 represents the intercept before the shift, and θ2  represents the change in the  
intercept at the time of the break. In the model with intercept and slope coefficient change λ1 ,  λ2,  λ3,  λ4, and  λ5  
denote the cointegration slope coefficients before the regime change, and λ11,  λ22,  λ33,  λ44,  and λ55  denote the 
change in the slope coefficients at the time of the break. 
As indicated in Cook (2006:1381) the residuals obtained from the above cointegrating regressions  are 
used in the Dickey-Fuller test to provide a modified Engle-Granger (1987) test which allows  for  structural 
change in the cointegration relationship: 
∆ệ = δệt-1 + ut          .                                       .                            .           (7) 
where ∆ is first difference operator. The break dates are attained by estimating the cointegration 
equations for all possible break dates and a break date is selected where the absolute value of the ADF test 
statistic is at its maximum. The null hypothesis tested is no cointegration with structural breaks against the 
alternative of cointegration with structural breaks.  
Data were sourced from Central Bank of the Gambia Annual Reports and Quarterly Bulletin (various 
issues), International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics  (various issues), World bank 
World Economic Indicators, World Economic Outlook database. The model was estimated for the period 1986:1 
-2012:4 using quarterly data. 
 
IV   Empirical Results and Analysis 
       Table 4.1 presents the results for the unit root test of the variables in the money demand function using Ng-
Perron (2001) in conjunction with the modified Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion. The empirical results 
show that all the variables (LMP, LGDP, SDR, TBR, INFL and EXR) are random walk  (non stationary) in 
levels but stationary after first difference, whether the MZa, MZt (modified Phillip-Perron), MSB(modified 
Sargan Bhargava) or MPT( modified point optimal test)  is used as test statistic. The similarity in the test results 
are not surprising given that they used generalised least squares detrended data which is actually the source of its 
power because as it ensures optimal  selection of the autoregressive truncation lag  under constant or trend or 
both.  Table 4.2  presents the results of the Gregory-Hansen cointegration with structural break. The break dates 
for the three models are  1995:1, 2000:2 and 2003:3.The results of the estimation suggest that  GH-1 with break 
date 1995:1  is the most plausible model  since the null hypothesis is rejected at 1% level. The graph of  
Gregory-Hansen cointegration tests with break identified at 1995:1 is shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 : Ng- Perron Unit Root Tests in Levels and in First Difference 
                                              Level                                                         First Difference 
Variable    MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT    MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT I(d) 
LM2 0.8433 0.6096 0.7229 39.6529 -9.151 -2.1345 0.2333 2.69526 1 
LGDP 1.23736 1.0806 0.8734 57.3999 -28.051 -3.6922 0.13163 1.04319 1 
SDR -3.1644 -1.2523 0.3959 7.7362 
  -
52.499 -5.1235 0.0976 0.4669    1 
INFL -4.5219 -1.4205 0.314 5.581 -31.555 -4.3331 0.2234 1.7295 1 
TBR -3.224 -1.2689 0.3936 7.5984 -22.435 -10.312 0.1908 2.9273 1 
EXR -0.9702 -0.4365 0.4499 14.1322 -15.268 -2.7269 0.18095 1.6051 1 
Critical 1% -13.8 -2.58 0.174 1.78 
Values 5% -8.1 -1.98 0.233 3.17 
10% -5.7 -1.62 0.275 4.45 
                   ==================================================== 
 
Table 4.2:Gregory Hansen Cointegration results with Structural breaks 1986:1 -2012:4+ 
Model          Break   GH test 1% 5% Reject Ho of 
Type         Date     Statistic     no Cointegration 
GH-1 1995:1 -7.312* -6.36 5.83 Yes 
GH-2 2000:2 -5.464 -6.05 -5.56 No 
GH-3 2003:3 -6.647 -7.31 -6.84 No 
Notes +. In the empirical estimation, a trimming region of between 15%-85% is used, giving that 15% in the 
beginning  and 15% at the end of the data points are cut off. Thus, the sample size is effectively reduced to 
70%.* Significant at  1%.  
Figure 4.1: Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Tests with Break Located at 1995:1 
 
The full estimates of the Gregory and  Hansen cointegration results with the associated structural break dates are 
indicated in Table 4.3.  It is evident that  GH-1  is the preferred long-run cointegration model with break date 
1995:1  because all the parameter estimates are statistically significant, they are theory consistent, data 
admissible and data coherent. 
The structural break identified to occur in 1995:1 reflects  political and economic shock arising from the military 
coup in 1994 which toppled a long serving civilian president Dauda Jawara, and the corresponding fall in foreign 
aid in the Gambia during the period.  The structural break is also clearly identifiable with the 50% devaluation of 
the CFA franc,  the border closure and transit controls in Senegal, and  the suspension of convertibility  of the  
CFA franc outside the franc zone in the period 1994-1996. 
Turning now to the parameter estimates we find that the income elasticity and the saving interest rate elasticity 
are positive, the treasury bill rate, inflation and exchange rate elasticities are  all negative as to be expected. The 
estimated income  elasticity at about 1.810 for the demand for money is greater than unity indicating that money 
is a luxury good in the Gambia, a finding that is consistent with other studies such as  Nwafor et al. (2007) for 
Nigeria (5.430),  Owoye and Onafowora (2007) for Nigeria (2.067), Nell (2003) for  South Africa (1.480), and 
Drama and Yao(2010) for Cote d’Ivoire (5.312). Similarly, in the estimated income elasticity for money in the 
study by Jammeh(2012) a value of about 1.8225 (see Table A3, p. 40) was obtained. According to Sriram(2009) 
long –run income elasticity greater than unity is to be expected for many developing countries where the 
financial system are underdeveloped and monetization is  faster than output growth.  
With respect to the estimated interest elasticity of the demand for money at -0.01168 we find that this is low, 
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revealing the absence of liquidity trap and hence the effectiveness of monetary policy  for economic stabilization 
in the Gambia. It would be recalled that Jammeh obtained  similar results with a long-run  interest elasticity of 
about  -0.0049575.  The parameter estimates of  the models (GH-2 and GH-3) are either too low and statistically 
insignificant as in the case of income elasticity of the demand for money in GH-2 model,  or are of the wrong 
sign in the case of income elasticity (GH-3) and  saving deposit rate elasticity(GH-2).  Since GH-1 model is 
congruent, robust and chosen, we estimate  an error correction model with an optimal lag length of 2 based on 
Schwarz  Bayesian and Hannan - Quinn information  criteria as shown in Table 4.4.  After applying  London 
School of Economics (LSE) Hendry’s general to specific approach(GETS) and Granger marginalization of 
irrelevant variables, we obtain  from the over pararameterized model a parsimonious model indicated in Table 
4.5.  
Most of the variables in the dynamic short-run demand for money equation are statistically significant at better 
than the 5% level. The only exception is the interest rate variable (TBR) which bears the appropriate negative 
sign but is statistically insignificant at conventional level. The poor behaviour of interest rate in the estimated 
short-run demand for money function may be a reason why the CBG relies more on open market operations 
(OMO) rather than interest rate in the manipulation of  monetary policy. However, it is important to emphasize 
that the interest rate variable is statistically significant at better than 0.1 % level in the long –run money demand 
function. 
Table 4.3: Cointegration Equation  1986:1- 2004:4                                               .  
                            GH-1 (1995:1)                  GH-2 (2000:2)                   GH-3 (2003:3) 
Variable            Coefficient                        Coefficient                       Coefficient         . 
Intercept          -26.0748*                             14.905*                              45.219* 
                           (-10.1343)                          (2.1968)                             (5.649) 
D1995:1              0.1394*            
                            (5.2571) 
LY                       1.8101 *                             0.0484                              -1.2673  *                                         
                           (15.8602)                           (0.1634)                             (-3.587) 
SDR                   0.01788*                            -0.0086**                           0.0245* 
                            (4.2984)                             (-2.034)                              (5.977) 
TBR                  -0.01168 *                           -0.0097*                            -0.0125* 
                          (-11.6350)                          (-9.8010)                             (-3.401) 
INFL                - 0.00705*                           - 0.0069*                           - 0.0035* 
                          (-7.3651)                            (-7.7940)                             (-2.7454) 
LEXR              -0.51917 *                              0.0149 *                             0.0152* 
                          (-10.3058)                           (5.596)                                (4.667) 
D2000 (2001)                                               0.2561*                              -23.688* 
                                                                       (8.2891)                              (-3.598) 
Trend                                                             0.0218  *                              0.027* 
                                                                       (8.790)                                 (9.273) 
LGDP D2001                                                                                               1.0041* 
                                                                                                                     (3.518) 
SDR D2001                                                                                                 0.0338* 
                                                                                                                     (3.5866) 
TBR D2001                                                                                                 -0.0017 
                                                                                                                     (-0.441) 
INFL D2001                                                                                              - 0.01723* 
                                                                                                                    (-6.2505) 
EXR D2001                                                                                                 -0.0136* 
                                                                                                                    (-7.4299) 
*  significant at 1%, **  significant at 5%. 
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Table 4.4: Lag Length Selection Criteria for the Overparameterized  Regression 
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  41.18152 NA   0.000112 -0.583630 -0.271010 -0.457107 
1  471.1905  799.8167  2.47e-08 -9.003810 -8.456724 -8.782395 
2  570.4228  178.6181  4.07e-09 -10.80846  -10.02690*  -10.49215* 
3  572.0171  2.774171  4.73e-09 -10.66034 -9.644326 -10.24914 
4  575.3767  5.644156  5.31e-09 -10.54753 -9.297053 -10.04144 
5  585.5687  16.51091  5.22e-09 -10.57137 -9.086426 -9.970388 
6  614.0967   44.50376*   3.56e-09*  -10.96193* -9.242522 -10.26606 
7  616.1733  3.114878  4.13e-09 -10.82347 -8.869588 -10.03270 
8  618.6170  3.518883  4.77e-09 -10.69234 -8.503996 -9.806678 
       
       Notes * indicates lag order selected by the criterion.                           
LogL=log likelihood test; LR=sequential modified LR test statistic(each test at 5% level); FPE=final prediction 
error; AIC=Akaike information criterion; SBIC=Schwarz  Bayesian information criterion, HQ=Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion. 
 
Table 4.5: Parsimonious Dynamic Short –Run Money Demand Estimates (1986Q3-2012Q4) 
Dependent Variable: ∆LMP   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
Oo     Constant -0.005861*** 0.003051 -1.921165 0.0577 
D1995 0.007780** 0.003359 2.316264 0.0227 
∆DLMP(-1) 0.617372* 0.066225 9.322296 0.0000 
∆LGDP 0.774014* 0.208302 3.715820 0.0003 
∆SDR 0.006998** 0.003140 2.228386 0.0282 
∆TBR -0.000155 0.000859 -0.180656 0.8570 
DINFL 0.003317* 0.000879 3.774828 0.0003 
∆INFL(-1) -0.002051** 0.000865 -2.371992 0.0197 
∆LEXR 0.430039* 0.065486 6.566898 0.0000 
∆LEXR(-1) -0.303434* 0.073324 -4.138259 0.0001 
ECM3(-1) -0.085851* 0.024843 -3.455680 0.0008 
     
Notes: * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 10%. 
Adj. R2=0.775, F-ratio=37.221, AIC=-5.690, SBIC=-5.414, DW=1.922, Breusch-Godfrey SC χ2(2) 
1.003(0.6056),      
nn χ2=0.555 (0.766),ARCH hsd χ2(2)=0.269(0.874), Ramsey RESET F(2,93) 1.414(0.248). 
The results further reveal that the short-run income and interest elasticities as well as the inflation 
expectation and currency-substitution elasticities are much lower in magnitude than their corresponding long run 
parameter estimates. The coefficient of the error correction variable at -0.08585 is negative, statistically 
significant and less than unity meaning that there is a smooth  adjustment rather than cyclical adjustment to 
equilibrium when out of equilibrium. However, the value is low, suggesting a sluggish adjustment as only about 
9 percent of the departure from equilibrium is reduced in the next quarter.  
The  Breusch-Godfrey SCχ2(2)=1.003 indicates absence of serial correlation. There is also no 
functional form misspecification RESET F(2,93)=1.414(0.248),  non-normality nnχ2 =0.555(0.766),  or 
heteroskedasticity  ARCH hsd χ2=0.269(0.874) where values are in brackets are the p-values. Thus, the 
estimated  short-run money demand function  is well determined.  
 The results also reveal that neither the  long-run money demand function nor the short-run money 
demand function were stable during the period under estimation. The cumulative sums of squares of recursive 
residuals, the CUSUM and the CUSUM of squares tests shown in Figures 4.3, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and  Figure 4.6  all 
indicate strong instability in the money demand function as the residual errors exceeded the bounds in general. 
The policy implications of the results are straightforward. The continued use of monetary targeting by 
the Central Bank of The Gambia is inappropriate and suboptimal. Figure 4.7 shows that there is no relationship 
between growth in money supply and inflation. The correlation coefficient between growth in money supply and 
inflation rate is estimated at 0.114 and statistically insignificant with p-value 0.238. An Alternative  and more 
flexible monetary policy framework  is required. Interest rate targeting is not also a viable option given that (i) 
the interest rate variable is not statistically significant in the short-run money demand function and (ii) the 
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financial market is small, shallow, and dominated by  few small banks. Uncertainty in foreign exchange flows 
and undiversified exports  renders exchange rate targeting unviable. Inflation targeting (IT) is also is not feasible 
at this stage because its  success factors such as government commitment to price stability, quality of data to 
work with and status of transparency and accountability in the CBG are weak.  Much work would be needed in 
these areas.  What may work in the Gambia at least is a flexible combination of elements of inflation targeting 
and monetary target as noted in Sriram(2009).  
 
Figure 4.2: Stability Test for Long –run Money Demand (Recursive Residuals) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Stability Test for Long-run Money Demand Function (CUSUM) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Stability Test for  Short –run Money Demand (Recursive Residuals) 
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Figure 4.5: Stability Test  for Short-run Money Demand  Function(CUSUM) 
 
 
Figure 4.6 : Stability Test for Short-run Money Demand Function (CUSUMSQ) 
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  Figure 4.7:  Growth in Broad Money Supply and Inflation (1986:1-2012:4) 
 
Correlation Coefficient: r= 0.114 (t-value=1.186), p-value=0.238 
 
 
V  Concluding Remarks 
One of the main objectives of monetary policy is to achieve price stability to promote economic growth. As part 
of the IMF sponsored stabilization programme the Gambia has been pursuing monetary targeting  framework. To 
ascertain whether  this policy satisfies the necessary condition for effectiveness we presented the results of an 
empirical investigation into the determinants and stability of money demand (M2)   in the short-run and long-run 
in the Gambia using quarterly data during the period 1986:1 - 2012:4.  Adopting a theoretical defensible 
specification of the money demand function in line with the Keynesian precautionary, transacation and  
speculative motives for holding money and its various extensions by Friedman, Baumol and Tobin, the paper  
applied  Gregory -Hansen cointegration techniques allowing for structural breaks. The study finds the existence 
of a long-run cointegration relationship  in the money demand function and its determinants in the Gambia. 
Income, saving deposit rates, inflation rate, interest rate and exchange rate were identified as the determinants of 
long-run and short-run money demand.  The cointegration relationship with breaks suggests a structural break 
which occurred in 1995:1 reflecting the military coup and fall in foreign aid in the Gambia during the period.  
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The structural break is also clearly identifiable with the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc,  the border closure 
and transit controls in Senegal, as well as the suspension of convertibility  of the  CFA franc outside the franc 
zone in the period 1994-1996. 
Through establishing  the existence of a  dynamic short-run  error correction model we found that 
cointegration model with shift in intercept best characterizes the equilibrium relationship of the money demand 
function when there exists a structural break. The speed of adjustment was found to be about 9 percent meaning 
that only 9 percent of the departure from equilibrium is reduced in the next quarter. This is indeed a very 
sluggish adjustment process. 
Furthermore,  by  the cumulative sums of squares of recursive residual test, CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
tests, we found that both the short-run and long-run money demand function in the Gambia were unstable for the 
period under investigation.  Causes of instability include but not limited to (i) political instability, (ii) changes in 
government policies affecting money growth and inflation, and (iii) introduction of financial innovations . 
Consequently the continued use of monetary targeting by the Central Bank of the Gambia (CBG) is 
misguided and suboptimal. This is even more so where there is no relationship between money supply and 
inflation.  The correlation coefficient between money supply growth and inflation was estimated at  0.114 and 
statistically insignificant with p-value 0.238. The Central Bank of the Gambia  (CBG) should  adopt  instead a 
more flexible monetary policy framework. Interest rate targeting is not also a viable option given that (i) the 
interest rate variable is not statistically significant and (ii) the financial market is small, shallow, and dominated 
by  few small banks. Uncertainty in foreign exchange flows and undiversified exports  renders exchange rate 
targeting unviable. What may work in the Gambia may be a flexible combination of inflation targeting and 
money supply target as noted in Sriram(2009) to maintain price stability and stimulate noninflationary economic 
growth. 
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